In a July 30 speech from the floor of the Senate honoring National Whistleblowers Day, Senator Charles Grassley announced that he is working on legislation that would “clarify” purported “ambiguities created by the courts” regarding the proper interpretation of the False Claims Act.
We recently reported on the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Ruckh v. Salus Rehabilitation LLC, which was the first case to assess the role of litigation funding agreements in qui tam litigation. In that case, the Eleventh Circuit rejected a challenge to the relator’s standing based on the existence of a litigation funding agreement.
At a recent U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Institute for Legal Reform meeting, Principal Deputy Associate Attorney General Ethan Davis set forth the current enforcement priorities of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), clarifying for corporations accessing stimulus funds or otherwise dealing with government programs or acting in regulated industries how it is focusing its efforts to target fraud in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic. While Davis underscored DOJ’s commitment to using the False Claims Act (FCA) and other “weapons in [its] arsenal” to fight fraud against the various pandemic stimulus programs, he also emphasized DOJ’s commitment to exercise enforcement discretion in cases lacking the hallmarks of bad corporate intent.
The 2015 Balanced Budget Act (BBA) requires that federal agencies make inflationary adjustments to civil monetary penalties on a yearly basis to account for inflation using calculations based on the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Consumer Price Index. On June 19, 2020, DOJ issued a final rule that will increase the civil penalties in FCA actions for penalties assessed after this date. The prior minimum False Claims Act penalty of $11,181 will be increased to $11,665 per claim. The maximum penalty will also increase from $22,363 to $23,331 per claim. The revised civil penalties, once adopted, will apply to all assessments of FCA civil penalties after the effective date, including penalties associated with violation predating the adjustment, but assessed on or after the date that the increases go into effect.
On May 28, 2020, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal with prejudice of a False Claims Act suit brought against Baylor Scott & White Health (“Baylor”), a network of acute care hospitals. The suit, brought by Integra Med Analytics, alleged that Baylor submitted $61.8 million in fraudulent claims to Medicare by using unsupported “higher-value” diagnosis codes to inflate Medicare reimbursements. The U.S. government previously declined to intervene in the suit.
On June 1, 2020, the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) publicized an updated version of its “Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Program” guidance. This is the third version of the document, with the DOJ having issued the guidance in 2017 (which we analyzed here) and revised it in April 2019 (which we analyzed here). This further revision is another reminder of the DOJ’s heightened focus and increasing sophistication regarding evaluating compliance programs during investigations. While the overall structure of the guidance generally remains consistent with the last version, the revisions provide additional insight into the DOJ’s expectations for corporate compliance programs. More specifically, the revisions highlight the importance of an adequately resourced and empowered compliance department, a constantly evolving compliance program based on the company’s current risk profile and relevant compliance issues, and the use of key compliance metrics to test the effectiveness of a compliance program.
In a May 4, 2020 letter to Attorney General William Barr, Senator Chuck Grassley “vehemently” disagreed with the Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) view, expressed in a brief recently filed with the Supreme Court by the Solicitor General, that the DOJ’s authority to dismiss an FCA claim “is an unreviewable exercise of prosecutorial authority.” As a principal author of the 1986 FCA amendments that substantially expanded the whistleblower provisions, Senator Grassley argued that he could “confidently say” that the text of the FCA plainly states that the court—not DOJ—should decide whether the government’s motion to dismiss a qui tam claim succeeds.
On March 6, 2020, the United States District Court for the Central District of California unsealed a qui tam complaint filed in May 2018 against Mobile Medical Examination (“MedXM”) and a number of Medicare Advantage Organizations (“MAOs), including, United Healthcare, Wellpoint, Aetna, Health Net, and Molina Healthcare. The qui tam suit, which was brought by former employees of MedXM, alleged that the defendants engaged in a scheme to submit false claims for payment to the federal healthcare programs by inflating risk adjustment payments and providing kickbacks to MA enrollees. The Department of Justice declined to intervene in the suit. (more…)
On January 27, 2020, Deputy Associate Attorney General Stephen Cox provided insight into current DOJ False Claims Act enforcement priorities and topics such as dismissals under the Granston Memo and reliance on subregulatory guidance as the basis of enforcement. A copy of his remarks can be found after clicking Read More.
On December 10, 2019, HHS-OIG issued a report examining the extent to which Medicare Advantage Organizations (“MAOs”) leverage chart reviews to increase risk-adjusted payments. OIG undertook its review due to concerns that MAOs “may use chart reviews to increase risk adjusted payments inappropriately.” Based on its analysis, OIG estimated that MAOs received approximately $6.7 billion in additional payments based on codes added during chart reviews. While OIG did not conclude that these payments constituted overpayments, it raised concerns about “the completeness of payment data submitted to CMS, the validity of diagnoses on chart reviews, and the quality of care provided to beneficiaries.”