11th Circuit Holds Eighth Amendment Applies to FCA Monetary Awards in Non-Intervened Cases

The Eleventh Circuit recently held that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on excessive fines applies to monetary awards in non-intervened FCA actions—the first federal court of appeals directly to address the application of this constitutional protection in non-intervened cases. See Yates v. Pinellas, No. 20-10276 (11th Cir.). However, the panel concluded that while the amount of the fine in this case was “very harsh,” it was not unconstitutionally excessive.

In Yates v. Pinellas, following the government’s declination, the district court imposed a total monetary award of $1,179,266.62 under the FCA based on the defendant’s submission of laboratory test claims to Medicare without a proper CLIA certificate. Specifically, the jury found that the defendant violated the FCA on 214 occasions and that the United States had incurred $755.54 in damages.  The court then imposed treble damages of $2,266.62 and statutory minimum penalties of $5,500 for each of the 214 violations, or $1,177,000, for a grand total of $1,179,266.62. The defendant moved for remittitur, arguing that this amount constituted an excessive fine in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court rejected the argument. (more…)

Supreme Court Unanimously Extends FCA Statute of Limitations to 10 Years for Non-Intervened Cases

On May 13, 2019, the United States Supreme Court unanimously held that the False Claims Act’s (“FCA”) alternative 10-year statute of limitations applies to non-intervened actions.  As previously reported here, Cochise Consultancy, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Hunt, presented two main issues: whether relators are entitled to invoke the FCA’s 10-year statute of limitations set forth in 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(2), and whether relators are considered “official[s] of the United States” whose knowledge is relevant for determining when the 10-year limitations period applies.  Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice Thomas ruled favorably for relators on both questions.


Supreme Court Considers Whether to Weigh In on Rule 9(b)’s Particularity Requirement and Constitutionality of the FCA’s Qui Tam Provisions

As we previously reported, in U.S. ex rel. Polukoff v. St. Mark’s Hospital, 895 F.3d 730 (10th Cir. 2018), the Tenth Circuit reversed a district court’s dismissal of qui tam claims, reasoning that the relator’s allegations satisfied Rule 9(b). In so holding, the Tenth Circuit “excuse[d] deficiencies that result from the plaintiff’s inability to obtain information within the defendant’s exclusive control.” Earlier this year, Defendant Intermountain Health Care filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, and the Supreme Court recently requested a response from Relator and the United States.


DOJ Nominee Barr Walks Back FCA Stand, But Not Entirely

Scott Stein (Chicago), Doreen Rachal (Boston), and Naomi Igra (San Francisco) authored an article for Bloomberg Law about Attorney General nominee William Barr’s testimony on the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act.  As discussed in the article, Barr questioned the constitutionality of the qui tam provisions earlier in his career but took a softer stance at his confirmation hearing.  The article, a copy of which can be accessed here, explains how Barr acknowledged a Supreme Court decision upholding the qui tam provisions but left open the possibility that a Barr-led DOJ would continue moving to dismiss whistleblower actions that do not advance the federal government’s interests.

Trump Pick for AG to Be Scrutinized for Views on False Claims Act Enforcement

Scott Stein (Chicago), Doreen Rachal (Boston), and Naomi Igra (San Francisco) have authored an article for Bloomberg Law regarding Attorney General nominee William Barr’s views on the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act.  As discussed in the article, Barr has previously called the qui tam provisions “patently unconstitutional.”  The article, a copy of which can be accessed here, discusses the basis for Barr’s views and how his confirmation may amplify DOJ’s recent efforts to move for dismissal of qui tam cases that do not serve the federal government’s interests.

Skyrocketing FCA Penalties Ripe For Constitutional Challenges

As we reported here, DOJ recently implemented steep increases to FCA penalties as required by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, effectively doubling the prior rates.  Constitutional challenges to FCA penalties under the Excessive Fines and Due Process clauses have traditionally not fared well.  Supreme Court case law calls on courts to examine the ratio between punitive and compensatory damages when assessing such challenges, and the steep hikes in penalties may alter how courts adjudicate these claims.  In an article available here, we discuss the future of constitutional challenges to FCA judgments in light of the starkly higher penalty range.

In Long Running Tuomey Saga, the Fourth Circuit Provides a Roadmap For Constitutional Challenges to Excessive FCA Awards

On July 2, 2015, the Fourth Circuit affirmed a $237 million verdict against Tuomey Hospital following a retrial in the government’s long-running effort to pursue alleged violations of the Stark law. (See our previous posts on the case here and here). As we previously reported, in 2013 in U.S. ex rel. Gosselin v. Bunk, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that FCA awards are subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny, but it rejected the constitutional challenge in that case without providing any concrete standards against which the constitutionality of an award in any particular case could be measured. In the more recent Tuomey opinion, the Fourth Circuit again rejected Eighth Amendment and Due Process challenges to the constitutionality of the award. However, the opinion provides a roadmap for future challengers that suggests that constitutional challenges could find traction in cases in which there is a significant discrepancy between per-claim damages and penalties.


District Court Blesses Retroactive Application of FCA’s False Statement Provision

Posted by Ellyce R. Cooper and Patrick E. Kennell III

In U.S. ex rel. De’von Cannon v. Rescare, Inc., No. 09-3068 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 2014) (Dkt. No. ___) (“Slip Op.”), Judge Diamond of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ruled that in its third try the Relator pled facts sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. This time the Relator argued the applicability of the amended (2009) version of § 3729(a)(1) rather than the pre-2009 version. Judge Diamond’s ruling follows the majority of courts around the country that have found that the 2009 amendment can be applied retroactively because it is civil and not punitive in nature.

In dismissing the first two versions of Relator’s complaint, Judge Diamond applied the pre-2009 version of § 3729(a)(1), and found that the Relator did not meet the intent requirement found in Allison Engine, Co., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 668-69 (2008) (“[A] person must have the purpose of getting a false or fraudulent claim ‘paid or approved by the Government’ in order to be liable under § 3729(a)(2).”). (Slip Op. at 4-5). However, in his Second Amended Complaint, Relator alleged for the first time that he was proceeding under the post-2009 Amendments to § 3729(a)(l) (specifically, Section 3729(a)(l)(B)) (“Any person who…knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim . . . is liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty.).

The amendments to the FCA took effect in May of 2009, and Relator’s allegations dealt with acts that took place “from November 2008 to March 2009.” (Slip Op. at 7). The Court noted that “Congress singled out subsection [3729(a)(1)(B)] to apply retroactively to all ‘claims made under the FCA that are pending on or after’ June 7, 2008.” (Slip Op. at 6). Judge Diamond ruled that the retroactive application of the Amendment would not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because the FCA is civil in nature, the monetary penalties of the FCA were not punitive in nature, and the “FCA’s penalty provision is . . . not excessive, given its remedial purposes: encouraging would-be qui tam relators and compensating the Government for investigative costs and the fraud itself.” (Slip Op. at 7-9, 12).

Court Affirms Relator’s Standing to Pursue Civil Penalties In The Absence of Damages

In many FCA cases, the potential liability for civil penalties is vastly higher than potential damages, even after trebling. For that reason, defendants have asserted various challenges, including Constitutional challenges, to the applicability or imposition of civil penalties. In a February 6 opinion, U.S. ex rel. Baklid-Kunz v. Halifax Hospital Medical Center, a district court in Florida rejected the argument that a relator who foregoes a claim for damages, and seeks only civil penalties under the FCA, lacks Article III standing. Relying primarily on the Supreme Court’s 2000 opinion in Vermont Agency of Natural Resources</em&ggt;, the district court concluded that the long tradition of qui tam actions – including those for recovery of civil penalties – dating back centuries, which was cited in Vermont Agency, supported the conclusion that qui tam suits seeking recovery of civil penalties only are properly understood to be “cases” or “controversies” within the meaning of Article III. The district court also cited in support the December 2013 opinion in U.S. ex rel. Bunk v. Gosselin World Wide Moving, N.V., in which the Fourth Circuit held that relators have standing to pursue qui tam claims for civil penalties, even in the absence of any claim for damages. As we previously reported, the Fourth Circuit in that case also rejected Constitutional challenge to imposition of civil penalties under the Eighth Amendment, holding that imposition of $24 million in civil penalties in the absence of any damages did not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against excessive fines.

UPDATE: Second Circuit Declares That The First Amendment Shields Off-Label Marketing

UPDATE: On Wednesday, the Food and Drug Administration announced that the government has decided not to seek en banc or Supreme Court review of the Second Circuit’s decision. Presumably, the government did not want to risk an adverse decision by the full Second Circuit or from the Supreme Court that could further restrict the FDA’s ability to bring off-label marketing cases. Instead of seeking further review, the FDA has sought to characterize the Caronia holding as a narrow one. In a statement explaining the government’s decision, the FDA said that it does not believe Caronia will “significantly affect the agency’s enforcement of the drug misbranding provisions of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.” According to the FDA, “[t]he decision does not strike down any provision of the . . . act or its implementing regulations, nor does it find a conflict between the act’s misbranding provisions and the First Amendment or call into question the validity of the act’s drug approval framework.”

This story is still playing out in other Circuits around the country, and the Supreme Court may review the issue in another case. But the government’s decision allowing this precedent to stand is good news for potential False Claims Act defendants in off-label marketing cases in the Second Circuit and elsewhere.


On December 3, 2012, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued a landmark ruling in United States v. Caronia, No. 09-5006 (2d Cir. December 3, 2012) declaring that truthful, non-misleading off-label promotion is constitutionally-protected commercial speech. In a 2-1 ruling accompanied by a vigorous dissent, the Court vacated the conviction of former Orphan Medical, Inc., sales representative Alfred Caronia for conspiracy to introduce a misbranded drug into interstate commerce. The government alleged that, while Caronia was an Orphan sales rep, he promoted the drug Xyrem for off-label use. In appealing his misdemeanor conviction, Caronia argued that the First Amendment barred the government from convicting him for disseminating truthful and non-misleading information about an FDA-approved drug “where such use is not itself illegal and others are permitted to engage in such speech.” Op. at 25. The majority agreed, in effect “declin[ing] the government’s invitation to construe the FDCA’s misbranding provisions to criminalize the simple promotion of a drug’s off-label use by pharmaceutical manufacturers and their representatives because such a construction . . . would run afoul of the First Amendment.” Op. at 33.

The majority dissected the often-unchallenged notion that off-label promotion, in and of itself, is illegal or renders a drug misbranded. It observed that neither the FDCA nor its implementing regulations expressly prohibit off-label promotion. Op. at 26. Instead, the regulatory scheme permits promotional speech to be used as evidence of a drug’s intended use. Yet despite the absence of a flat prohibition on off-label communication, Caronia argued on appeal that he was being prosecuted for having engaged in truthful, non-misleading speech. The government, by contrast, contended that his speech served to establish evidence of intent to introduce misbranded Xyrem into interstate commerce. The majority disagreed, finding that “the record makes clear that the government prosecuted Caronia for his off-label promotion.” Op. at 20.

The Court then analyzed the extent to which Caronia’s off-label promotional speech was protected by the First Amendment. In arriving at its conclusion that the speech was in fact protected, the Court relied on last year’s Supreme Court decision in Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). In Sorrell, which also originated in the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court struck down a Vermont law prohibiting pharmaceutical companies from using prescribed-identifying information in their marketing efforts. The Second Circuit used Sorrell as a backdrop and concluded that the government’s prohibition of off-label communication was both content and speaker-based. It then moved to the next step of the analysis and asked whether the government had shown that the restrictions on speech were consistent with the First Amendment. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980), the Second Circuit found that the government had satisfied only two of the four prongs necessary to show that commercial speech is not protected by the First Amendment. As part of that ruling, the majority concluded that there were less restrictive ways for the FDA to regulate the provision of information about off-label usage, citing in support an article by Sidley partner Coleen Klasmeier. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the “government cannot prosecute pharmaceutical manufacturers and their representatives under the FDCA for speech promoting the lawful, off-label use of an FDA-approved drug.” Op. at 51.

A spirited dissent authored by Judge Livingston, who also dissented from the Second Circuit’s majority opinion in Sorrell, challenged the majority at almost every turn. Judge Livingston disagreed with the majority’s interpretation that Caronia was convicted for promoting Xyrem off-label, finding instead that “Caronia’s speech was used simply as evidence of Xyrem’s intended uses. . . .” Dissent at 7. Accordingly, she concluded that his “conviction does not run afoul of the First Amendment.” Id.

For now, the ruling applies only in the Second Circuit, which encompasses New York, Vermont, and Connecticut. It remains to be seen whether the United States will seek rehearing by the full Second Circuit or review by the Supreme Court. Regardless, the ruling has broad implications for pharmaceutical manufacturers at a time when DOJ is extracting record settlements in cases premised on allegations of off-label marketing. As the dissent noted, “the majority calls into question the very foundations of our century-old system of drug regulation.” Dissent at 1. Judge Livingston argued that if drug companies “were allowed to promote FDA-approved drugs for nonapproved uses, they would have little incentive to seek FDA. approval for those uses.” Id. at 21. As a result, Judge Livingston feared a scenario where “a drug manufacturer must be allowed to distribute a drug for any use so long as it is approved for one use.” Id. at 23. Under the majority’s view, it’s not clear how, in the Second Circuit, the government could enforce what has long been considered a bright-line rule against off-label promotion.

While the court’s ruling plainly forecloses criminal prosecution under the FDCA for providing truthful, non-misleading promotional information about off-label uses, the impact in civil FCA cases based on off-label promotion is less clear. The opinion appears to undercut any argument that communicating truthful, non-misleading promotional information about off-label uses is sufficient to render a claim “false or fraudulent.” But what if the off-label use is not covered by Medicare or Medicaid because it is not for a “medically accepted indication?” Does Caronia provide a First Amendment shield from FCA liability for engaging in off-label promotion of a drug that is not covered by federal healthcare programs for the off-label use? Can the government or a relator overcome Caronia in a civil FCA case by simply characterizing evidence of off-label promotion as evidence of intent to cause the submission of false claims? These and similar issues will no doubt be hotly contested in future off-label cases, and the impact of the Second Circuit’s ruling will no doubt continue to be explored on this blog and in other forums.