On October 28, 2021, the Third Circuit affirmed a district court’s grant of the United States’ motion to dismiss—over the relator’s objection—a qui tam alleging that the defendant had caused hospitals to submit false claims. Adopting the Seventh Circuit’s approach, the court determined that in evaluating the government’s motion to dismiss over a relator’s objection in a declined qui tam, courts should apply the standards for voluntary dismissals contained in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a).
The recently proposed amendments to the False Claims Act have stalled out for now. As discussed here and here, these bipartisan proposed amendments—led by Senator Grassley—would have made four changes to the FCA, and most notably, would have radically altered the burden of proof for establishing materiality.
But after making a sudden appearance on Friday in the Senate infrastructure bill, last night those amendments were excluded. This means that the amendments’ proponents will need to consider other vehicles, particularly “must pass” bills such as the budget resolution. The Senate is expected to consider amendments to the budget resolution later this week.
We will continue to monitor developments regarding this proposed legislation.
As discussed further here, a bipartisan group of senators, led by Senators Grassley (R-IA), Leahy (D-VT), Wicker (R-MI), Durbin (D-IL), and Kennedy (R-LA), recently introduced proposed amendments to the False Claims Act. Those amendments have now been incorporated into the infrastructure bill currently being debated in the Senate. (more…)
A bipartisan group of senators, led by Senators Grassley (R-IA), Leahy (D-VT), Wicker (R-MI), Durbin (D-IL), and Kennedy (R-LA), has introduced the False Claims Amendments Act of 2021. This legislation is worth watching not just because it would significantly amend the FCA, but because Senator Grassley has a successful track record of shepherding through to passage legislation reversing gains made by defendants in FCA cases.
On July 7, 2021, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court’s grant of the United States’ motion to dismiss—over the relator’s objection—two qui tams that challenged pharmaceutical patient support programs. While the court’s decision is consistent with those of other courts of appeal that have confirmed DOJ’s broad authority to dismiss qui tams over relators’ objections, the Fifth Circuit appears to add some teeth to the requirement that the relator be provided with a “hearing” before such a dismissal may be granted.
On May 21, 2021, the Department of Justice filed a brief in opposition to a petition for writ of certiorari filed by the relator in U.S. ex rel. Cimznhca, LLC v. UCB, Inc. The petition challenges the Seventh Circuit’s decision reversing the district court’s denial of the government’s motion to dismiss over the relator’s objection. In reversing, the Seventh Circuit determined that, so long as relators have an opportunity to be heard under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A), the government may dismiss qui tams when it satisfies the standard contained in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i). That rule provides that a plaintiff may dismiss an action by serving notice of dismissal any time before the opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgment.
Senator Charles Grassley, who supported the nomination of Merrick Garland for Attorney General, sent the then-nominee a letter on February 24 to ask the Department of Justice to work to “further clarify and strengthen the False Claims Act.” As we reported in previous posts (here, here, and here), Senator Grassley has publicly criticized DOJ’s position that its authority to dismiss FCA suits over relators’ objections is virtually unfettered, and has criticized the materiality standard established by the Supreme Court in Escobar as lending undue weight to role of government conduct (or lack thereof) in response to allegations of fraud. The letter discloses that Senator Grassley is working with “a cadre of bipartisan Senate colleagues” to “strengthen” and “improve” the False Claims Act by narrowing the materiality requirement, and by requiring a court to assess the merits of a qui tam in deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss filed by DOJ. We will continue to monitor and report on any such legislation that may ultimately be proposed.
In a July 30 speech from the floor of the Senate honoring National Whistleblowers Day, Senator Charles Grassley announced that he is working on legislation that would “clarify” purported “ambiguities created by the courts” regarding the proper interpretation of the False Claims Act.
In a May 4, 2020 letter to Attorney General William Barr, Senator Chuck Grassley “vehemently” disagreed with the Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) view, expressed in a brief recently filed with the Supreme Court by the Solicitor General, that the DOJ’s authority to dismiss an FCA claim “is an unreviewable exercise of prosecutorial authority.” As a principal author of the 1986 FCA amendments that substantially expanded the whistleblower provisions, Senator Grassley argued that he could “confidently say” that the text of the FCA plainly states that the court—not DOJ—should decide whether the government’s motion to dismiss a qui tam claim succeeds.
In its May 4, 2020 Opposition to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari in United States ex rel. Schneider v. JPMorgan Chase NA, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) advocated a reading of the FCA that preserves the Executive Branch’s unfettered discretion to dismiss a qui tam, absent “extraordinary circumstances.” DOJ’s power to dismiss derives from FCA Section 3730(c)(2)(A), which provides that the Government “may dismiss” a relator’s action if the relator “has been notified by the Government of the filing of the motion and the court has provided the person with an opportunity for a hearing on the motion.” Since the revealing of the Granston Memo, which we have addressed here and here, DOJ has more frequently sought to use this statutory power. In hopes of doing so in an unrestricted manner, DOJ presented the Supreme Court with the following question in its Opposition: “Whether the United States’ decision to dismiss a relator’s FCA claim under Section 3730(c)(2) is subject to judicial review where the relator does not allege that the government’s dismissal decision was a fraud on the court.”