Supreme Court Mulls Scope of DOJ Dismissal Authority
On December 6, 2022, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in United States ex rel. Polansky v. Executive Health Resources, which presents the question of whether the government has the authority to dismiss a qui tam suit after initially declining to intervene, and if so, what standard of review applies to the government’s motion to dismiss. Overall, the lines of questioning suggest that the Court will conclude that the government may dismiss qui tam suits after initially declining to intervene. However, there was no clear consensus around how to define a judicially enforceable standard for evaluating the government’s dismissal authority.
Supreme Court Declines to Address Application of 9(b) to the FCA
Yesterday the Supreme Court denied cert in a trio of cases seeking clarification as to the pleading standard required in FCA cases under Rule 9(b). The petitioners urged the Court to remedy what they characterized as a circuit split over how much detail whistleblowers and the government must supply about alleged false claims in order to survive a motion to dismiss. As discussed further here, the Solicitor General opposed these cert petitions and argued that the circuits have “largely converged” in their application of Rule 9(b) to FCA complaints.
A variety of reasons exist for why a cert petition may fail to garner the requisite number of votes, and in declining to hear these cases, it is not clear whether the Court is convinced that there is uniformity (or at least not significant discord) among the courts of appeal on this issue.
Supreme Court Grants Certiorari to Resolve Circuit Split on the Government’s Authority to Dismiss FCA Cases Over Relators’ Objections
On June 21, 2022, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a Circuit split on the standard for evaluating the government’s authority to dismiss a qui tam over the relator’s objection. As we have previously written (see here and here), various Circuits have adopted different standards. The Supreme Court has agreed to review a decision of the Third Circuit affirming a district court’s grant of the United States’ motion to dismiss a qui tam. (more…)
DOJ Seeks to Avoid Supreme Court Review of Rule 9(b) Circuit Split; Argues Standard Has Largely “Converged”
There has been growing variation among courts of appeal over the appropriate pleading standard to apply under Rule 9(b) to the element of presentment, i.e., the requirement that plaintiffs plead with particularity the submission of a false claim to the government for payment. This topic has been the subject of repeated Supreme Court cert petitions (as discussed further here), and the topic has been raised yet again in a cert petition filed late last year in Johnson v. Bethany Hospice and Palliative Care, LLC (No. 21-462) (lower court opinion discussed here). The relator in Bethany Hospice, whose case was dismissed by the Eleventh Circuit for “rely[ing] on mathematical probability to conclude that a defendant surely must have submitted a false claim at some point”, seeks Supreme Court review of this “longstanding circuit split.” (more…)
DOJ Opposes Supreme Court Review of Granston Dismissal Standard
On May 21, 2021, the Department of Justice filed a brief in opposition to a petition for writ of certiorari filed by the relator in U.S. ex rel. Cimznhca, LLC v. UCB, Inc. The petition challenges the Seventh Circuit’s decision reversing the district court’s denial of the government’s motion to dismiss over the relator’s objection. In reversing, the Seventh Circuit determined that, so long as relators have an opportunity to be heard under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A), the government may dismiss qui tams when it satisfies the standard contained in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i). That rule provides that a plaintiff may dismiss an action by serving notice of dismissal any time before the opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgment.
DOJ Says Its Authority to Dismiss Qui Tam Suits Is Expansive Notwithstanding Circuit Split
In its May 4, 2020 Opposition to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari in United States ex rel. Schneider v. JPMorgan Chase NA, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) advocated a reading of the FCA that preserves the Executive Branch’s unfettered discretion to dismiss a qui tam, absent “extraordinary circumstances.” DOJ’s power to dismiss derives from FCA Section 3730(c)(2)(A), which provides that the Government “may dismiss” a relator’s action if the relator “has been notified by the Government of the filing of the motion and the court has provided the person with an opportunity for a hearing on the motion.” Since the revealing of the Granston Memo, which we have addressed here and here, DOJ has more frequently sought to use this statutory power. In hopes of doing so in an unrestricted manner, DOJ presented the Supreme Court with the following question in its Opposition: “Whether the United States’ decision to dismiss a relator’s FCA claim under Section 3730(c)(2) is subject to judicial review where the relator does not allege that the government’s dismissal decision was a fraud on the court.”
Supreme Court Unanimously Extends FCA Statute of Limitations to 10 Years for Non-Intervened Cases
On May 13, 2019, the United States Supreme Court unanimously held that the False Claims Act’s (“FCA”) alternative 10-year statute of limitations applies to non-intervened actions. As previously reported here, Cochise Consultancy, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Hunt, presented two main issues: whether relators are entitled to invoke the FCA’s 10-year statute of limitations set forth in 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(2), and whether relators are considered “official[s] of the United States” whose knowledge is relevant for determining when the 10-year limitations period applies. Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice Thomas ruled favorably for relators on both questions.
Supreme Court Considers Whether to Weigh In on Rule 9(b)’s Particularity Requirement and Constitutionality of the FCA’s Qui Tam Provisions
As we previously reported, in U.S. ex rel. Polukoff v. St. Mark’s Hospital, 895 F.3d 730 (10th Cir. 2018), the Tenth Circuit reversed a district court’s dismissal of qui tam claims, reasoning that the relator’s allegations satisfied Rule 9(b). In so holding, the Tenth Circuit “excuse[d] deficiencies that result from the plaintiff’s inability to obtain information within the defendant’s exclusive control.” Earlier this year, Defendant Intermountain Health Care filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, and the Supreme Court recently requested a response from Relator and the United States.
Supreme Court Appears Poised To Extend FCA Statute of Limitations to 10 Years In Non-Intervened Cases
On March 19, 2019, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Cochise Consultancy v. United States ex rel. Hunt, a case that appears likely to resolve a circuit split on an issue of critical importance: in non-intervened FCA cases – which comprise the vast majority of FCA cases – are relators entitled to invoke the FCA’s alternative 10 year statute of limitations set forth in 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(2)? That provision provides for a ten year statute of limitations if the action is brought no more than three years after “the official of the United States charged with responsibility to act” knows, or should know, the material facts of the violation. While an opinion is not expected until later this year, the tenor and content of the Justices’ questions suggest that the Court’s answer to that question is likely to be yes.
Supreme Court Agrees to Resolve Circuit Split on FCA Statute of Limitations in Non-Intervened Cases
On November 16, the Supreme Court agreed to resolve a percolating circuit split on an issue of critical importance under the FCA: are relators in non-intervened cases entitled to invoke the FCA’s alternate 10 year statute of limitations? The grant of certiorari in Cochise Consultancy, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Hunt, 887 F.3d 1081 (11th Cir. 2018) makes it the third Supreme Court case in recent years addressing the False Claims Act’s limitations periods. (more…)