By

Jaime L.M. Jones

22 May 2017

Fourth Circuit Rules that Falsity Under Escobar Does Not Require Specific Misrepresentations

Courts have focused their attention post-Escobar primarily on whether plaintiffs have met the heightened standard for pleading the violation of a material statute, regulation, or contractual requirement. Under the implied certification theory claims must also still be false, yet the Supreme Court in Escobar provided less guidance as to the contours of falsity. The Fourth Circuit recently advanced a broad definition that permits plaintiffs to avoid pointing to any specific misrepresentations. See United States ex rel. Badr v. Triple Canopy, Inc., No. 13-2190 (4th Cir. May 16, 2017).

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19 May 2017

Ninth Circuit Affirms Broad Reach of Public Disclosure Bar

A recent decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirms the real challenges the public disclosure bar can pose to whistleblowers. In Amphastar Pharms. Inc. v. Aventis Pharma SA, No. 5:09-cv-00023-MJG-OP, 2017 WL 1947890 (C.D. Cal. May 11, 2017), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a California federal judge’s dismissal of a False Claims Act suit by Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Amphastar”) alleging the government overpaid for a blood thinner that was improperly patented, finding that the allegations were already public. (more…)

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15 May 2017

DOJ Weighs in on Materiality Standard Post-Escobar

In a May 8, 2017 statement of interest, DOJ made a bold attempt to strip the heightened materiality standard articulated in Escobar (previously reported here) of all of its meaning.  DOJ’s statement was filed in support of relator’s Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment dismissing the underlying declined qui tam case, which took exception to the court’s determination that the government’s continued payment of defendant’s claims “despite its actual knowledge that certain requirements were violated” was “very strong evidence that those requirements are not material.” United States ex rel. Kolchinksy v. Moody’s Corp., – F.Supp.3d –, 2017 WL 825478, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. March 2, 2017) (citing Escobar).  DOJ took aim at the court’s conclusion, arguing that “an agency’s continued payment of claims to a potential FCA defendant who faces public allegations of fraud is insufficient – by itself – to establish that the alleged fraud is immaterial.” (more…)

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27 April 2017

Ninth Circuit Urged to Reverse District Court Dismissal of “Fraud on the FDA” Claims

In a variety of matters, DOJ and relators have attempted to base claims under the FCA on alleged violations of the FDCA or FDA regulations, by arguing that such violations constitute “fraud on the FDA,” and that the resulting claims for payment to other agencies for associated products are false.  As we have discussed (here, here, and here), so far plaintiffs have had little success with this theory, including in the First and Fourth Circuit Courts of Appeal.  Last week, a panel of the Ninth Circuit heard oral arguments in United States ex rel. Campie v. Gilead Sciences, Inc., and the government and the plaintiff’s bar no doubt have pinned their hopes on that court reversing the trend.

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06 April 2017

District Court Calls Into Question Scope of CMS Overpayment Rules

The question of when an overpayment becomes “identified” for purposes of False Claims Act liability has generated significant uncertainty, and one district court just added more fodder for debate. See UnitedHealthcare Ins. Co. v. Price, No. 16-cv-157 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2017). The Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) requires persons to report and return overpayments from Medicare or Medicaid within 60 days of identification, and the failure to do so can trigger FCA liability. The ACA delegated to CMS the task of defining when an entity has “identified” an overpayment. CMS promulgated two rules (in May 2014 for Medicare Advantage (“MA”) plans and Part D Sponsors and in February 2016 for Medicare Part A/B providers), which equate “identification” to circumstances in which a person “has, or should have through the exercise of reasonable diligence, determined that the person has received an overpayment.” The “should have identified” standard generated concerns that CMS was using a simple negligence standard. The FCA, however, requires proof of at least “reckless disregard,” which courts have equated to gross (not merely simple) negligence.

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17 February 2017

Court Rejects Armstrong’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ignoring Escobar, and Sets the Case for Trial Where Armstrong Faces Nearly $100M in Damages

On February 13, 2017, the District Court for the District of Columbia rejected motions for summary judgment filed by cyclist Lance Armstrong and his agents Capital Sports and Entertainment Holdings Inc. (CSE) in an FCA suit alleging the defendants violated the FCA by issuing payment invoices to the United States Postal Service (USPS) under sponsorship agreements while actively concealing Armstrong’s use of performance enhancing drugs (PEDs).  The Court rejected Armstrong’s motion because it found that the government raised genuine issues of fact regarding the applicability of two of its three theories of FCA liability, its common-law claims, and the issue of actual damages.  As a result, the Court will set the case for trial, where Armstrong may face nearly $100M in damages.  A copy of the court’s order can be found here.

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14 February 2017

First Circuit Affirms Strict Limits of FCA Reach

In U.S. ex rel. Alex Booker and Edmund Hebron v. Pfizer, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed two district court judgments rejecting allegations of the defendant’s sales and marketing activities related to its drug Geodon, noting that, after 6 years of litigation, the whistleblowers failed to provide sufficient evidence to show that defendant’s alleged conduct resulted in the actual submission of fraudulent claims.

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06 February 2017

Court Rejects DOJ Attempt to Insulate Prior Payment Practices from Discovery

Historical government payment practices have gained new importance following the Supreme Court’s guidance in Escobar that such practices can preclude a finding that regulatory compliance was material to the payment of an allegedly false claim.  Evidence regarding the government’s prior knowledge of regulatory violations and continued payment can also bear on the mens rea element of an FCA claim.  Perhaps not surprisingly in light of the importance of this evidence, DOJ recently tried—unsuccessfully—to block a defendant’s efforts to discover information relating to historical payment determinations by CMS Medicare Administrative Contractors (“MACs”).  See United States ex rel. Ribik v. HCR ManorCare, Inc., No. 09-cv-13 (E.D. Va. Feb. 3, 2017).

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28 September 2016

DOJ Reinforces Importance of Early and Material Cooperation In Post-Yates World

In a speech on Tuesday, September 27, 2016, Principal Deputy Associate Attorney General Bill Baer said that in the post-Yates world companies must provide early and material assistance to DOJ’s efforts to hold companies and individuals accountable for corporate wrongdoing – including by voluntarily disclosing information before they receive a subpoena – if they hope to receive cooperation credit.  In doing so, Baer called out those banks caught up in DOJ’s enforcement focus on mortgage-backed securities.  Baer claims those companies did not cooperate early enough and that DOJ thus rejected their requests for substantial cooperation credit, ultimately extracting billions of dollars in settlements.  Baer thus made clear the importance of early cooperation:  “little or no cooperation credit will be afforded in situations where the supposed cooperation occurs after the department has completed the bulk of its investigation.”  In addition to cooperating early, companies also must provide specific information about any and all employees involved in wrongdoing and information that is unknown to DOJ and materially assists its investigation in order to obtain meaningful cooperation credit.  At the same time, Baer described conduct that will not qualify a company for cooperation credit; specifically, simply producing information in response to a subpoena or CID and making a presentation to DOJ that seeks to limit or eliminate liability will not be viewed as cooperation.  Indeed, Baer’s speech raises questions as to whether legitimate efforts to defend conduct under investigation may even disqualify a company that otherwise has been cooperative from receiving cooperation credit.

Baer’s speech can be accessed here.

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26 September 2016

Court Rules That Only DOJ’s Knowledge is Relevant for Statute of Limitations Defense, But Permits Discovery of Communications That Should Have Put DOJ on Notice

The ability to invoke the FCA’s statute of limitations defense often hinges on the timing of when “the official of the United States” knew or should have known of the alleged fraud.  Most courts have sided with the government’s interpretation of “the official of the United States” as meaning only the Attorney General or his or her designees.  A district court recently sided with the majority interpretation, but in so doing, affirmed avenues of discovery outside of DOJ Civil that should have put the government on notice of a potential FCA claim.  See United States v. Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc., No. 12-cv-04110 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 2016).

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