In a 2-1 decision, the Seventh Circuit joined the Third, Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits in holding that the standard for “reckless disregard” under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) established by the Supreme Court in Safeco Insurance Company of America v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007) applies equally to the False Claims Act (“FCA”). Applying Safeco, the Seventh Circuit also held that it was objectively reasonable for Defendants, a group of retail pharmacies, to charge the Medicare Part D and Medicaid programs their retail cash prices as their “usual and customary” prices for drugs rather than prices offered through competitor price-match discount programs.
In an interesting opinion interpreting the FCA’s alternate remedy provision, the D.C. Circuit recently held that a relator who filed a False Claims Act (FCA) case that was ultimately settled was not entitled to a share of the monetary relief that the government obtained through the settlement of a separate Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) enforcement action against the defendant pharmaceutical manufacturer despite the fact that the enforcement action was based on similar underlying facts. The court explained that whether a separate government action is an “alternative remedy” in which a relator may share turns not on the commonality of facts between the government’s action and the FCA action, but on the type of claim brought and whether that claim could have been brought by the relator under the FCA.
A bipartisan group of senators, led by Senators Grassley (R-IA), Leahy (D-VT), Wicker (R-MI), Durbin (D-IL), and Kennedy (R-LA), has introduced the False Claims Amendments Act of 2021. This legislation is worth watching not just because it would significantly amend the FCA, but because Senator Grassley has a successful track record of shepherding through to passage legislation reversing gains made by defendants in FCA cases.
A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit recently reversed a district court decision that held that local coverage determinations (“LCDs”) are valid only when issued through a 60-day notice-and-comment rulemaking process. Agendia, Inc. v. Becerra, No. 19-56516 (9th Cir. July 16, 2021). The impact of the district court’s ruling—and a spirited dissent from the Ninth Circuit majority opinion—would have been significant for healthcare enforcement actions, including under the False Claims Act. LCDs have never gone through notice-and-comment rulemaking. A decision that all LCDs are accordingly invalid would have undermined a number of False Claims Act cases premised on the use of LCDs to apply the “reasonable and necessary” standard for Medicare reimbursement. The Ninth Circuit is the first court of appeals to weigh in on this issue, however, and others may yet reach a different conclusion.
On July 7, 2021, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court’s grant of the United States’ motion to dismiss—over the relator’s objection—two qui tams that challenged pharmaceutical patient support programs. While the court’s decision is consistent with those of other courts of appeal that have confirmed DOJ’s broad authority to dismiss qui tams over relators’ objections, the Fifth Circuit appears to add some teeth to the requirement that the relator be provided with a “hearing” before such a dismissal may be granted.
On May 21, 2021, the Department of Justice filed a brief in opposition to a petition for writ of certiorari filed by the relator in U.S. ex rel. Cimznhca, LLC v. UCB, Inc. The petition challenges the Seventh Circuit’s decision reversing the district court’s denial of the government’s motion to dismiss over the relator’s objection. In reversing, the Seventh Circuit determined that, so long as relators have an opportunity to be heard under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A), the government may dismiss qui tams when it satisfies the standard contained in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i). That rule provides that a plaintiff may dismiss an action by serving notice of dismissal any time before the opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgment.
On April 26, 2021, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal with prejudice of a qui tam action brought by two former employees of a Georgia hospice provider and associated medical providers. The Court held that the relators did not plead with sufficient particularity under Rule 9(b) that the defendant had submitted a false claim to the government. Estate of Debbie Helmly, et al. v. Bethany Hospice and Palliative Care of Coastal Georgia, LLC, et al., No. 20-11624 (11th Cir. Apr. 26, 2021).
Senator Charles Grassley, who supported the nomination of Merrick Garland for Attorney General, sent the then-nominee a letter on February 24 to ask the Department of Justice to work to “further clarify and strengthen the False Claims Act.” As we reported in previous posts (here, here, and here), Senator Grassley has publicly criticized DOJ’s position that its authority to dismiss FCA suits over relators’ objections is virtually unfettered, and has criticized the materiality standard established by the Supreme Court in Escobar as lending undue weight to role of government conduct (or lack thereof) in response to allegations of fraud. The letter discloses that Senator Grassley is working with “a cadre of bipartisan Senate colleagues” to “strengthen” and “improve” the False Claims Act by narrowing the materiality requirement, and by requiring a court to assess the merits of a qui tam in deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss filed by DOJ. We will continue to monitor and report on any such legislation that may ultimately be proposed.
On January 14, 2021, Acting Assistant Attorney General Jeffrey Bossert Clark of the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that the Civil Division recovered over $2.2 billion in settlements and judgments under the False Claims Act (FCA) for fiscal year 2020. This represents a more than $850 million decrease from last year’s figure and a $3.9 billion decrease from the all-time recovery record in 2014. Detailed statistics on FCA cases from 1986 through FY 2020 are available here.
On November 19, 2020, the Illinois Supreme Court issued an opinion broadly construing relators’ standing to sue under the Illinois Insurance Claims Fraud Prevention Act (“Act”) (740 ILCS 92/1 et seq.). The Act is similar to the Illinois False Claims Act, but allows private citizens (“interested persons”) to sue on behalf of the State to remedy alleged fraud against private insurers. As with the Illinois False Claims Act, the State retains ultimate control over the litigation under the Act whether or not it intervenes, but the relator is entitled to a portion of the proceeds of any settlement or judgment if the litigation succeeds.