On October 28, 2021, the Third Circuit affirmed a district court’s grant of the United States’ motion to dismiss—over the relator’s objection—a qui tam alleging that the defendant had caused hospitals to submit false claims. Adopting the Seventh Circuit’s approach, the court determined that in evaluating the government’s motion to dismiss over a relator’s objection in a declined qui tam, courts should apply the standards for voluntary dismissals contained in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently allowed a previously dismissed qui tam case to proceed against Molina Healthcare of Illinois (“Molina”). The suit, brought by a relator who founded Molina subcontractor GenMed, alleges that Molina fraudulently billed Illinois’ Medicaid program for skilled nursing facility (“SNF”) services that were not actually provided. The district court previously dismissed the case at the pleading stage in June 2020, finding that the relator’s complaint insufficiently alleged that Molina knew its alleged false claims were material. The Seventh Circuit, in a split decision, reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. (more…)
In a 2-1 decision, the Seventh Circuit joined the Third, Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits in holding that the standard for “reckless disregard” under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) established by the Supreme Court in Safeco Insurance Company of America v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007) applies equally to the False Claims Act (“FCA”). Applying Safeco, the Seventh Circuit also held that it was objectively reasonable for Defendants, a group of retail pharmacies, to charge the Medicare Part D and Medicaid programs their retail cash prices as their “usual and customary” prices for drugs rather than prices offered through competitor price-match discount programs.
In an interesting opinion interpreting the FCA’s alternate remedy provision, the D.C. Circuit recently held that a relator who filed a False Claims Act (FCA) case that was ultimately settled was not entitled to a share of the monetary relief that the government obtained through the settlement of a separate Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) enforcement action against the defendant pharmaceutical manufacturer despite the fact that the enforcement action was based on similar underlying facts. The court explained that whether a separate government action is an “alternative remedy” in which a relator may share turns not on the commonality of facts between the government’s action and the FCA action, but on the type of claim brought and whether that claim could have been brought by the relator under the FCA.
A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit recently reversed a district court decision that held that local coverage determinations (“LCDs”) are valid only when issued through a 60-day notice-and-comment rulemaking process. Agendia, Inc. v. Becerra, No. 19-56516 (9th Cir. July 16, 2021). The impact of the district court’s ruling—and a spirited dissent from the Ninth Circuit majority opinion—would have been significant for healthcare enforcement actions, including under the False Claims Act. LCDs have never gone through notice-and-comment rulemaking. A decision that all LCDs are accordingly invalid would have undermined a number of False Claims Act cases premised on the use of LCDs to apply the “reasonable and necessary” standard for Medicare reimbursement. The Ninth Circuit is the first court of appeals to weigh in on this issue, however, and others may yet reach a different conclusion.
On July 7, 2021, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court’s grant of the United States’ motion to dismiss—over the relator’s objection—two qui tams that challenged pharmaceutical patient support programs. While the court’s decision is consistent with those of other courts of appeal that have confirmed DOJ’s broad authority to dismiss qui tams over relators’ objections, the Fifth Circuit appears to add some teeth to the requirement that the relator be provided with a “hearing” before such a dismissal may be granted.
On July 6, 2021, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part a district court’s dismissal of the qui tam suit against IBM in United States ex rel. Cimino v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., No. 19-7139. The relator alleged that IBM and the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) had entered into a software license agreement, but that upon learning that the IRS was uninterested in renewing the agreement, IBM fraudulently induced the IRS to extend the contract. In particular, IBM allegedly collaborated with the auditor of the agreement, resulting in an audit finding that the IRS owed IBM $292 million for noncompliance with the contract’s terms. IBM then offered allegedly to waive that fee in exchange for the IRS renewing the agreement. The relator further alleged that once the new agreement was in place, IBM nonetheless collected $87 million of the noncompliance penalty by disguising that amount as fees for products and services that were never provided. According to the relator, this scheme yielded FCA liability in two ways: first, IBM fraudulently induced the IRS to renew the agreement; second, IBM submitted false claims by billing $87 million for unprovided products and services.
On May 21, 2021, the Department of Justice filed a brief in opposition to a petition for writ of certiorari filed by the relator in U.S. ex rel. Cimznhca, LLC v. UCB, Inc. The petition challenges the Seventh Circuit’s decision reversing the district court’s denial of the government’s motion to dismiss over the relator’s objection. In reversing, the Seventh Circuit determined that, so long as relators have an opportunity to be heard under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A), the government may dismiss qui tams when it satisfies the standard contained in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i). That rule provides that a plaintiff may dismiss an action by serving notice of dismissal any time before the opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgment.
Late last week, Judge Patti Saris (D. Mass.) issued an opinion on cross-motions for summary judgment filed by a qui tam relator and Massachusetts and a group of defendants that includes South Bay Mental Health Center (“South Bay”) and its private equity fund owner, permitting the vast majority of plaintiffs’ claims to proceed to the jury. The opinion addresses important questions of law as to each of the elements of the FCA related to claims to Medicaid for services allegedly provided in violation of various state regulatory requirements. However, the opinion is most notable for being the first to hold at the dispositive motion stage that a private equity fund and its principals can act with the requisite scienter and cause the submission of false claims, and thus be exposed directly to the treble damages and statutory penalties of the FCA as a result of conduct by a healthcare provider portfolio company. As such, we may expect it to add momentum to DOJ’s stated intent to pursue FCA claims against PE investors in the industry.
The Ninth Circuit recently revived a claim in a qui tam lawsuit against a medical device manufacturer based on a “fraud on the FDA” theory of liability under the False Claims Act. See United States ex rel. The Dan Abrams Co. LLC v. Medtronic PLC et al., No. 19-56377 (9th Cir. April 2, 2021).