On July 5, 2019, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a qui tam lawsuit against several chemical manufacturers alleging that they violated the False Claims Act by failing to pay civil penalties owed under the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601 (1976) (“TSCA”) for the manufacturers’ repeated failures to report “information regarding the dangers of isocyanate chemicals” to the EPA. The law firm Kasowitz Benson Torres LLP, which is the relator in the case, urged the D.C. Circuit “to become the first court to recognize FCA liability based on the defendants’ failure to meet a TSCA reporting requirement and on their failure to pay an unassessed TSCA penalty.” The D.C. Circuit declined that invitation.
As we previously reported, in U.S. ex rel. Polukoff v. St. Mark’s Hospital, 895 F.3d 730 (10th Cir. 2018), the Tenth Circuit reversed a district court’s dismissal of qui tam claims, reasoning that the relator’s allegations satisfied Rule 9(b). In so holding, the Tenth Circuit “excuse[d] deficiencies that result from the plaintiff’s inability to obtain information within the defendant’s exclusive control.” Earlier this year, Defendant Intermountain Health Care filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, and the Supreme Court recently requested a response from Relator and the United States.
Earlier this month, in a FCA case in which the Government intervened, the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota held that the Government was obligated to produce evidence that supported its allegation that amounts that physicians paid for social trips and other benefits provided by Defendants were below fair market value. In United States v. Cameron-Ehlen Grp., Inc., No. 13-CV-3003 (WMW/DTS), 2019 WL 1453063, at *1 (D. Minn. Apr. 2, 2019), the Government’s Complaint-In-Intervention alleged that Defendants, Precision Lens and Paul Ehlen, schemed to pay kickbacks—in the form of “lavish hunting, fishing and golf trips, private plane flights, frequent-flyer miles and other items of value”—to physicians to induce them to use products supplied by Defendants. The Complaint-In-Intervention includes several specific examples where physicians “were remunerated by not paying the full fair market value for trips and other benefits provided by Defendants.” (more…)
When a relator brings a civil action for a violation of the FCA, the Government “may elect to intervene and proceed with the action,” and, thereafter, the Government “shall have the primary responsibility for prosecuting the action.” 31 U.S.C. 3730(b)(2), (c)(1). In United States ex rel. Brooks, et al. v. Stevens-Henager College, Inc., et al., No. 2:15-cv-00199, 2019 WL 186663 (D. Utah Jan. 14, 2019), a judge in the District of Utah addressed the issue of “whether a relator retains an independent right to maintain the non-intervened portion of an action” in which the Government only partially intervened. The district court held that, under the plain language and legislative history of the statute, the relator has no right to litigate the non-intervened portions of the case. (more…)
We have previously discussed (here and here) the enforceability of a relator’s pre-filing release of FCA claims—an issue on which the FCA is silent. Recently, in United States ex rel. Susan Class et al., v. Bayada Home Health Care Inc., No. 2:16-cv-00680 (E.D. Pa. Sep. 24, 2018), a district judge in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania weighed in on the enforceability of pre-filing releases and held that, as a matter of public policy, these releases are unenforceable where “the Government did not have sufficient knowledge of the Relators’ allegations prior to the signing of Relators’ releases.” (more…)
In Escobar, the Supreme Court held that the implied false certification theory of liability is viable under the False Claims Act when “at least two conditions” are satisfied: “[F]irst, the claim does not merely request payment, but also makes specific representations about the goods or services provided; and second, the defendant’s failure to disclose noncompliance with material statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirements makes those representations misleading half-truths.” As we have previously discussed here, courts are split as to whether Escobar’s two-part test is a mandatory baseline to demonstrate an implied false certification or merely one way to plead such a claim, leaving open the door for other variants of implied certification claims not explicitly identified by the Supreme Court. Recently, in United States ex rel. Scott Rose, et al. v. Stephens Institute, No. 17-15111 (9th Cir. Aug. 24, 2018), the Ninth Circuit held that Escobar’s two-part test was mandatory—effectively overruling its pre-Escobar test for establishing implied certification claims outlined in Ebeid ex rel. United States v. Lungwitz, 616 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2010). (more…)
The False Claims Act provides that a case must be brought within the later of (1) six years after the date on which the alleged violation is committed, or (2) three years after “the date when the facts material to the right of action are known or reasonably should have been known by the official of the United States with responsibility to act in the circumstance, but in no event more than 10 years after the date on which the violation is committed.” 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b). When the government has declined to intervene in an FCA action and a relator files a qui tam suit more than six years after the violation, the Fourth and Tenth Circuits have held that the relator’s suit is time-barred and the relator cannot take advantage of § 3731(b)(2)’s more generous statute of limitations. Last week, in United States ex. Rel. Hunt v. Cochise Consultancy, Inc., __ F.3d __, 2018 WL 1736788 (11th Cir. Apr. 11, 2018), the Eleventh Circuit split from the Fourth and Tenth Circuits, holding that § 3731(b)(2) “applies to an FCA claim brought by a relator even when the United States declines to intervene.” And departing from the Ninth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit further held that because the period “begins to run when the relevant federal government official learns of the facts giving rise to the claim, when the relator learned of the fraud is immaterial for statute of limitations purposes.” (more…)