We recently reported on the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Ruckh v. Salus Rehabilitation LLC, which was the first case to assess the role of litigation funding agreements in qui tam litigation. In that case, the Eleventh Circuit rejected a challenge to the relator’s standing based on the existence of a litigation funding agreement.
As we previously reported, in U.S. ex rel. Polukoff v. St. Mark’s Hospital, 895 F.3d 730 (10th Cir. 2018), the Tenth Circuit reversed a district court’s dismissal of qui tam claims, reasoning that the relator’s allegations satisfied Rule 9(b). In so holding, the Tenth Circuit “excuse[d] deficiencies that result from the plaintiff’s inability to obtain information within the defendant’s exclusive control.” Earlier this year, Defendant Intermountain Health Care filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, and the Supreme Court recently requested a response from Relator and the United States.
The False Claims Act’s anti-retaliation provision, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h), provides relief to an “employee, contractor, or agent,” who is “discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, or in any other manner discriminated against in the terms and conditions of employment because of lawful acts done . . . in furtherance of an action” under the FCA. Recently, in Smith v. LHC Group, Inc. et al., __ F. App’x __, 2018 WL 1136072 (6th Cir. Mar. 2, 2018) (unpublished), the Sixth Circuit clarified that the test for an employer’s intent in a “constructive discharge” retaliation case is an objective one — joining the majority of circuits that have rejected a subjective employer intent requirement in constructive discharge cases in different contexts. (more…)