On April 30, the First Circuit held in a case alleging off-label marketing that the first-to-file bar can apply even where the earlier filed-case was based on different off-label uses. See U.S. ex rel. Wilson v. Bristol-Myers Squibb, Inc., Case No. 13-1948 (1st Cir. April 30, 2014) The basic facts were as follows: Relator Wilson, a former pharmaceutical sales representative, alleged that his former employer engaged in off-label promotion of Plavix and Pravachol. The district court granted a motion to dismiss those claims under the first-to-file bar, based on a case that had been filed by a different relator (Richardson) prior to the filing of Wilson’s initial complaint. The Richardson complaint also alleged that the defendants had engaged in a broad, nationwide scheme to promote and prescribe Pravachol and Plavix for off-label uses. The district court held that both the Richardson and Wilson complaints alleged widespread off-label promotion of the same drugs. The only material difference between the two complaints is that the specific off-label uses alleged in the Richardson complaint were different from the off-label uses (and associated disease states) in the Wilson complaint. The primarily issue raised on appeal was whether the Richardson complaint alleged the “essential facts” on which the Wilson complaint was based such that the first-to-file bar applied, notwithstanding the fact that Wilson’s complaint alleged different off-label uses than the Richardson complaint.
The First Circuit held that the first-to-file bar applied, notwithstanding that the two complaints were based on different off-label uses of the same drugs, because “[t]he overlaps among the two complaints were considerable: the same defendants, the same drugs, the assertion of nationwide scheme, and the allegations of specific mechanisms of promotion common to both and leading to common patterns of submission of false claims under the federal Medicaid program.” Op. at 15. The fact that the two cases were based on different off-label uses, the court held, was “not enough to reasonably conclude the earlier Richardson Complaint was not a related claim to the government based on the facts. Whether the first complaint results in there being an actual government investigation and whether any such investigation extends to off-label uses to treat different diseases is not the point.” Id. at 16.
The First Circuit also affirmed the district court’s denial of Wilson’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint. The proposed amended complaint would have added a new co-relator (Allen, another former sales representative), and expanded the scope of the allegations. The First Circuit agreed that to the extent that the new co-relator’s allegations replicated those of Wilson’s earlier complaint, they were barred by the first-to-file rule. And the First Circuit agreed with the district court’s alternative ruling that to the extent that the proposed new complaint added substantively new allegations not previously disclosed to the government, the proposed complaint violated the FCA’s filing and service requirements, 31 USC 3730(b)(2).
This case suggests that the first-to-file bar may have broad application to pharmaceutical marketing cases where there is a previously-filed case involving the same drug, even where the improper uses alleged are different in the two cases. Pharmaceutical marketing cases typically allege nationwide schemes based on the same type of conduct (e.g., training of sales representatives, speaker bureaus, continuing medical education), so the key types of allegations that the First Circuit found triggered the first-to-file bar in Wilson are likely to be present in other pharmaceutical marketing cases. Wilson supports the argument that the first-to-file bar can be applied even where the indications for which a drug is allegedly being marketed improperly are different from the indications that were the subject of an earlier-filed case.