Sep 52013

Seventh Circuit Slams Relator’s Unsavory Tactics; Declines to Mandate Use of Expert Testimony on Claims and Causation Issues

Gordon D. Todd and Jeff Beelaert
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Posted by Gordon Todd and Jeff Beelaert

In Watson v. King-Vassel, No. 12-3671 (7th Cir. Aug. 28, 2013), the Seventh Circuit had stern words for a relator’s unsavory litigation tactics, but also declined to endorse a rule mandating expert testimony on certain issues in every case.

The Relator, Dr. Watson, alleged that defendant Dr. King-Vassel’s off-label prescription of psychotropic drugs to a minor caused the submission of false claims to the Medicaid program. The defendant sought summary judgment because, inter alia, Relator had failed to adduce any expert testimony, including to explain how Medicaid claims are submitted, to prove that by prescribing off-label the defendant knowingly caused the submission. The district court granted summary judgment, holding that expert testimony would be required to explain whether defendant actually caused the claims to be filed, and also holding that expert testimony would be required to explain pharmaceutical data including information in medical compendia, i.e., whether a submitted claim was false.

The Seventh Circuit reversed. As to the first issue, the Court held that expert testimony was not required to prove either how the Medicaid system works, or the defendant doctor’s knowledge regarding the submissions. Instead, a relator need only show that the defendant “had reason to know of facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that she was causing the submission of a false claim,” or that she “failed to make a reasonable and prudent inquiry into that possibility.” The minor’s mother had testified that she had provided defendant with the minor’s Medicaid billing information and had never paid for the services out-of-pocket. This, the Circuit held, was sufficient for a reasonable juror to extrapolate the defendant’s state of mind. The Circuit rejected the district court’s characterization of Medicaid as a “grand mystery” and “black box,” instead analogizing it to a car: even though “most people could not explain every step turn-key and ignition, the cause-effect relationship is commonly appreciated.” In light of this analogy, a reasonable juror could find, without the aid of expert testimony, that the doctor’s prescription caused a Medicaid claim to be filed.

The Court also rejected as “premature and overbroad” the District Court’s blanket statement that “medical documents typically are not readily understandable by the general public,” thereby requiring expert testimony to explain medical compendia in every case. Instead, the Circuit held that whether such testimony is required turns on a more case-specific analysis as to whether a particular off-label use is supported by one or more compendia. On remand, the Court noted, a more specific analysis may show that the lack of expert testimony is indeed fatal.

While reversing summary judgment, the Court disapproved sternly of the Relator’s “unsavory” litigation generation tactics. The Relator had never treated or even met the patient, but had instead advertised for minor Medicaid patients to “participate in a possible Medicaid fraud suit.” Relator then secured the minor’s medical records by soliciting the minor’s mother to lie to the defendant doctor about their intended use. The Court approved of the District Court’s use of its inherent powers to impose monetary sanctions on Relator and his counsel for their conduct, which the Circuit hoped would dissuade the future use of such tactics.

Gordon D. Todd

Washington, D.C.

gtodd@sidley.com

Jeff Beelaert

JeffBeelaert@sidley.com

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